## AMENDMENT TO RULES COMM. PRINT 115–23 OFFERED BY MR. CARBAJAL OF CALIFORNIA

At the end of subtitle D of title XII, add the following new section:

| I  | SEC. 12 ASSESSMENT OF SUBVERSIVE ACTIVITIES BY        |
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| 2  | THE RUSSIAN FEDERATION.                               |
| 3  | (a) FINDINGS.—Congress finds the following:           |
| 4  | (1) In 1986, an interagency working group             |
| 5  | issued a report assessing "active measures" by the    |
| 6  | former Soviet Union against the United States.        |
| 7  | (2) The working group concluded that "there is        |
| 8  | a massive and highly organized effort by the Soviet   |
| 9  | Union and its proxies to influence world opinion".    |
| 10 | (3) The working group further observed that           |
| 11 | "this effort includes public diplomacy to enhance the |
| 12 | Soviet image abroad and also includes a per-          |
| 13 | sistent, widespread program of disinformation and     |
| 14 | deception designed to discredit the U.S. image        |
| 15 | abroad and disrupt U.S. policy objectives.".          |
| 16 | (4) Active measures by the Russian Federation         |
| 17 | have shown no diminution since the last report        |
| 18 | issued by the working group in 1987, including—       |

| 1  | (A) to undercut democratic processes and               |
|----|--|
| 2  | institutions in the United States and partner          |
| 3  | nations;   |
| 4  | (B) to challenge the international liberal             |
| 5  | order; and   |
| 6  | (C) to establish an unfettered sphere of in-           |
| 7  | fluence.   |
| 8  | (5) The Director of National Intelligence con-         |
| 9  | cluded in light of the Russian Federation's hacking    |
| 10 | of the 2016 presidential election that "Russian ef-    |
| 11 | forts to influence the 2016 U.S. presidential election |
| 12 | represent the most recent expression of Moscow's       |
| 13 | longstanding desire to undermine the U.Sled liberal    |
| 14 | democratic order.".                                    |
| 15 | (6) The Russian Federation utilizes an array of        |
| 16 | military, cyber, intelligence, and economic tactics to |
| 17 | weaken United States democratic institutions, divide   |
| 18 | Europe from the United States, divide Europe from      |
| 19 | within, undermine organizations such as the North      |
| 20 | Atlantic Treaty Organization and the European          |
| 21 | Union, and coerce partners to cooperate with Rus-      |
| 22 | sia.   |
| 23 | (7) Militarily, the Russian Federation forced          |
| 24 | the illegal occupation of Crimea in March 2014 and     |
| 25 | the invasion of Georgia in 2008.                       |

| 1  | (8) The Russian military continues to engage in        |
|----|--|
| 2  | acts of aggression and intimidation against United     |
| 3  | States allies across Europe.                           |
| 4  | (9) The Russian Federation's subversive activi-        |
| 5  | ties undermine trust in democratic systems, giving     |
| 6  | rise to political instability.                         |
| 7  | (b) Assessment of Subversive Activities by             |
| 8  | THE RUSSIAN FEDERATION.—                               |
| 9  | (1) Report.—Not later than 180 days after              |
| 10 | the date of the enactment of this Act, the Secretary   |
| 11 | of State, in coordination with the Secretary of De-    |
| 12 | fense, shall submit to Congress a report setting forth |
| 13 | an assessment, obtained by the Secretaries for pur-    |
| 14 | poses of the report, of subversive activities by the   |
| 15 | Russian Federation.                                    |
| 16 | (2) Independent assessment.—                           |
| 17 | (A) In general.—The assessment ob-                     |
| 18 | tained for purposes of paragraph (1) shall be          |
| 19 | conducted by a federally funded research and           |
| 20 | development center (FFRDC), or another ap-             |
| 21 | propriate independent entity with expertise in         |
| 22 | diplomatic and military developments in Europe         |
| 23 | and the Russian Federation, selected by the            |
| 24 | Secretary for purposes of the assessment.              |

| 1  | (B) Use of previous studies.—The en-             |
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| 2  | tity conducting the assessment may use and in-   |
| 3  | corporate information from previous studies on   |
| 4  | matters appropriate to the assessment.           |
| 5  | (3) Elements.—The assessment obtained for        |
| 6  | purposes of paragraph (1) shall include the fol- |
| 7  | lowing:  |
| 8  | (A) An assessment of disinformation and          |
| 9  | propaganda activities of the Russian Federa-     |
| 10 | tion, including an assessment of—                |
| 11 | (i) legal and financial support for              |
| 12 | disinformation and propaganda activities         |
| 13 | with respect to the United States and for-       |
| 14 | eign countries;                                  |
| 15 | (ii) the overall structure of the Rus-           |
| 16 | sian Government's disinformation and in-         |
| 17 | fluence apparatus, including its defense         |
| 18 | and intelligence agencies and propaganda         |
| 19 | outlets; and                                     |
| 20 | (iii) propaganda techniques, including           |
| 21 | forgery, use of media representatives and        |
| 22 | proxies, use of front organizations, and ef-     |
| 23 | forts to influence international organiza-       |
| 24 | tions.   |

| 1  | (B) An assessment of support by the Rus-           |
|----|--|
| 2  | sian Federation for separatist activities and      |
| 3  | other aggressive actions aimed at undermining      |
| 4  | the sovereignty of foreign countries, particularly |
| 5  | in Ukraine and the Baltic countries.               |
| 6  | (C) An assessment of cyber intrusions by           |
| 7  | the Russian Federation to influence the infra-     |
| 8  | structure and democratic processes in the          |
| 9  | United States and other countries.                 |
| 10 | (D) An assessment of the use of energy ex-         |
| 11 | ports by the Russian Federation for purposes of    |
| 12 | political or economic coercion.                    |
| 13 | (E) An assessment of suppressive demo-             |
| 14 | cratic conditions in the Russian Federation, in-   |
| 15 | cluding—   |
| 16 | (i) suppression of freedom of the                  |
| 17 | press;   |
| 18 | (ii) treatment of political activists and          |
| 19 | opposition leaders;                                |
| 20 | (iii) suppression of minority rights;              |
| 21 | (iv) suppression of human rights; and              |
| 22 | (v) efforts to undermine nongovern-                |
| 23 | mental organizations and Russian civil so-         |
| 24 | ciety.   |

1 (4) FORM.—The report required under para-2 graph (1) shall be submitted in unclassified form, 3 but may include a classified annex.

